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Using COVID-19 to Strengthen the WHO:
Promoting Health and Science Above Politics
Lawrence O. Gostin & Sarah Wetter
On April 14, 2020, President Trump announced the suspension of funding for the World Health
Organization (WHO) for 60 to 90 days to investigate WHO’s handling of the COVID-19
pandemic—citing WHO’s “disastrous decision” to oppose a travel ban on China, and for being
slow and “China-centric.”1 The Trump administration has also directed agencies to remove
WHO references from COVID-19 fact sheets, and delayed a resolution at the United Nations
Security Council calling for WHO support.2 Republican lawmakers backed President Trump,
even calling for WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus to resign.
The President’s criticisms shift blame away from the administration’s own response to COVID19. Certainly, China failed in its international duty to respond rapidly and transparently to the
novel coronavirus, and it suppressed truthful information provided by independent scientists
and whistleblowers, which propelled a localized outbreak into a pandemic now in over 210
countries.
WHO’s ability to police state conformance with international health obligations is limited, at
best. The Organization relies on countries to report outbreaks, provide essential data, share
virus samples, and invite WHO into their sovereign territories. When WHO declares a public
health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) under the International Health Regulations
(IHR), governments push back, fearing major disruptions to their economies. WHO is also
vulnerable to country largess in securing its funding. WHO is often placed in an impossible
position: if it acts too harshly against member states, countries may refuse to cooperate, and
pull their funding, ultimately putting global health at greater risk.
We are facing a once-in-a-century health emergency, with WHO under attack as never before.
But out of a crisis can come an historic opportunity to strengthen WHO to become the health
agency the world desperately needs. What might WHO reform look like if we truly want to
empower the Organization, as we should? That reform should address the structural problems
that put WHO in the crossfires of geopolitical disputes and force it to appeal to countries’
political interests instead of the best scientific evidence. First, it is important to consider how,
and why, COVID-19 has become so politicized and divisive.
WHO’s COVID-19 Response in China Highlights Political and Legal Constraints
On January 5, 2020, five days after China reported pneumonia-like cases of unknown cause,
WHO alerted the world of the threat emanating from Wuhan’s Huanan Seafood Market, but
advised countries not to impose travel or trade restrictions.3 This recommendation was
consistent with long-term WHO practice, guided by the IHR. By January 12th, China reported
that the outbreak had been caused by a novel coronavirus and shared the virus’s genome
sequence worldwide. Yet China suppressed other vital information, with cases going

unreported by the Chinese Centers for Disease Control, and the government punishing doctors
for spreading “rumors” about the magnitude of the threat. On January 14th, WHO
disseminated China’s report that there was no evidence of SARS-Cov-2 transmission between
humans, despite growing evidence to the contrary.4
China is a highly centralized nation, with Beijing controlling local government decision-making
and a history of curbing journalistic freedoms. In 2003, China had delayed and underreported
cases of another novel coronavirus (SARS). As early as December 2019, Taiwanese health
authorities warned WHO of the emerging threat, including human-to-human transmission, but
WHO did not act on these warnings. Meanwhile, China has actively blocked Taiwan from
becoming a WHO member state.
WHO confirmed human-to-human transmission on January 22th after SARS-CoV-2 spread to
Thailand, South Korea, and Japan by travelers who had not visited Wuhan’s seafood market.
Despite international spread, the IHR emergency committee recommended against declaring a
PHEIC on January 23rd. Just one day earlier, China locked down Wuhan city’s 11 million
residents under a cordon sanitaire. On January 30th, after travelling to China and praising
China’s outbreak response, Director-General Tedros declared COVID-19 a PHEIC.5
Knowing Dr. Tedros as well as I (LG) do, I believe he was using diplomacy to coax China into
deeper international cooperation. Any Director-General must balance science against politics.
In 2014, Margaret Chan was criticized after delaying a declaration of PHEIC for the West African
Ebola outbreak, seeking to avoid damaging countries’ fragile economies. On January 30th, Dr.
Tedros declared COVID-19 a PHEIC, recommending strict control measures. This gave the world
ample notice to prepare and respond to a dangerous novel virus. The Organization has been
proactive and transparent issuing global briefings virtually daily.
Since January 30th, COVID-19 has circumnavigated the globe. Thus far, the pandemic has
impacted mostly high-income countries in east Asia, Europe, and North America. Powerful
countries have largely steered the response themselves, with minimal contributions from WHO.
But now the pandemic is marching into lower-income regions, especially sub-Saharan Africa,
where WHO’s resources and technical expertise will prove critical. With its already paltry
funding and political support at a low ebb, WHO must still rise to the challenge of partnering
with lower-income countries, focusing on both health and equity. In this once-in-a-century
health crisis, we have the opportunity to empower WHO to protect the world—following no
political agenda, while advocating for science and equity.
Give WHO the Power and Freedom to Act for Global Health and Science
As long as WHO so heavily depends on cooperation and support from member states, the
leadership will be constrained in its ability to work with the singular aim of doing what is
necessary to advance global health and WHO’s constitutional principle of the right to health.
WHO should have members’ funding and the political backing that it urgently needs to lead a

global pandemic response. Several key structural reforms could empower WHO, limiting
adverse political influence.
An Emboldened Director-General. Even without structural reform, the Director-General
should act boldly. The Director-General should always speak truth to power, standing up to
even the most powerful member states. WHO would actually enhance its reputation as the
global health leader by acting transparently according to the highest scientific standards.
Provide Ample Funding Within WHO’s Control. The international community must fund
WHO on a scale commensurate with its global mandate, enabling WHO to set norms, publish
guidance, and offer technical assistance on a wide array of health issues. Sustainable funding
would also help insulate WHO from member state interference. A sizable portion of WHO
funding should come from mandatory assessments rather than voluntary (earmarked)
contributions. Presently, not even one-quarter of WHO’s budget is from mandatory
assessments. States should raise this level to at least 50%, while at least doubling WHO’s overall
budget, which would still leave WHO at funding levels below the US Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention.6
Empower WHO to Use Unofficial Data Sources. Following China’s lack of transparency
during SARS, WHO fundamentally revised the IHR (articles 9-11), giving the Director-General
power to consider “unofficial” information sources, for example, by journalists, civil society, or
health professionals. Yet, delays in sharing key data during COVID-19 highlight the need for
further IHR reforms. Presently, WHO must collaborate with the member state, seeking to verify
reported information before taking action. Only if the government refuses collaboration may
WHO share unofficial data with other states. The Director-General should assemble an on-call
independent expert group, like the IHR roster of experts, to independently assess official and
unofficial data. If the expert consensus supports the reliability of unofficial data sources, it
should have the power to recommend sharing those data with other states and the public.
Further, sources that provide unofficial data need to be protected. Presently, the
source’s confidentiality is protected only if WHO deems protection “duly justified.” Failure to
safeguard privacy could chill whistle blowers, fearful of being sanctioned by government. That
is exactly what happened to Li Wenliang, the Chinese physician who tried to alert the world to
COVID-19.
Compliance-Enhancing Incentives for Member States. There is a long history of member
states failing to comply with IHR norms and WHO recommendations on travel, trade, and
quarantine. Most states have not built core health system capacities as required by the IHR. The
Director-General could publicly “call out” offending member states. To ensure transparency,
civil society could provide “shadow reports” on state adherence to their obligations. Ultimately,
WHO could withdraw voting rights for members who chronically flout legal norms.
Putting the World’s Health First

The political realities that the Director-General faces create a tension between the world’s
health and what WHO’s leadership is empowered to do. Reducing this tension can only benefit
global health and advance WHO’s mission. It will not be easy, but as the world will surely look
to alter the global health architecture after COVID-19, strengthening WHO will become
essential. The Organization richly deserves, and has earned, robust funding and unwavering
political support. The next time WHO is caught in the middle of a geopolitical struggle, world
leaders must put health and science first, backing the Director-General to lead the global
response.
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